In this paper we study the amount of secret information that must be given to participants in any secret sharing scheme that is secure against coalitions of dishonest participants in the model of Tompa and Woll 20]. We show that any (k; n) threshold secret sharing algorithm in which any coalition of less than k participants has probability of successful cheating less than some > 0 it must give to each participant shares whose sizes are at least the size of the secret plus log 1 :
Introduction
In 1979 Blakley 2] and Shamir 15] This problem, known in the literature as \(k; n) Threshold Secret Sharing", has received considerable attention in the last few years because of its many applications to several elds, as data security, secure computation and others 10]. For an extensive bibliography and illustration of the main results in the area we refer the reader to 17] and 18].
2: for any j < k, for any j-tuple of distinct indexes i 1 ; : : : ; i j ; 1 i j n; for each The rst property implies that the shares held by any group of k participants univocally determines the secret s 2 S. Notice that the second property means that the probability that the secret is equal to s given that the shares held by any group of j < k participants are d 1 ; : : : ; d j is the same as the a priori probability that the secret is s. Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares of less than k participants enables a Bayesian opponent to modify an a priori guess regarding which the secret is.
Using the information theoretic concepts of entropy (see Appendix for de nitions and properties) the two previous conditions can be stated as follows 12 An important issue in the implementation of secret sharing schemes is the size of shares distributed to participants since the security of a system degrades as the amount of the information that must be kept secret increases. Recently, several papers studied this topic and both upper bounds and lower bounds on the size of the shares have been . In this paper we study the amount of secret information that must be given to participants in terms of the probability that the previously described attack be successful. Our motivations are based on the observation that the Tompa and Woll secret sharing scheme requires that each participant must receive an amount of secret information that grows with the level of security one imposes against dishonest coalitions. We show that this phenomenon is unavoidable, in the sense that in any secret sharing scheme that has probability of successful cheating less than some > 0; it must give to each participant shares whose size is at least the size of the secret plus log 1 :
1 : The security of the schemes presented in this paper is unconditional, since they are not based on any computational assumption.
2 Robust Secret Sharing Schemes Tompa and Woll 20] de ned the cheating probability as \the probability that from k ? 1 forged shares d 0 one". In order to formally de ne the problem let us introduce some notations. For a xed , 1 > 0, we de ne a (k; n; ) Robust Secret Sharing Scheme as secret sharing scheme that satis es the following properties: Properties P1 and P2 are those of a (k; n) threshold scheme. The property P3 assures that any cheating tentative has arbitrarily small probability of succeeding, even though the cheaters know the correct secret.
Note that the condition > 0 for (k; n; ) Robust Secret Sharing Schemes is necessary, since the probability of cheating P (Cheat j D i 1 ; : : : ; D i k?1 ; S) cannot be 0 in any (k; n) Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme. For a proof of this fact see the remark following Lemma 2.
A quantity that will play an important role to derive our result is the probability that k ? 1 participants P i 1 ; : : : ; P i k?1 can guess the share of the k-th participant P i k , given that The following theorem represents our main result. From Lemmas 1 and 2, and Property P3 of (k; n; ) Robust Secret Sharing Scheme, the theorem follows. Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 1 and properties (1) and (2) of the entropy in the Appendix.
The corollary shows that in a (k; n; ) Robust Secret Sharing Scheme the size of the shares given to participants | measured as the number of bits necessary to their representation | necessarily grows as decreases. For completeness, we recall that in the Tompa and Woll algorithm the size of shares log jD i j satis es the bound 2 log (jSj ? 1)(k ? 1) + k < log jD i j < 2 log (jSj ? 1)(k ? 1) + k + 1:
We have proved a tradeo between the size of the shares and the probability of successful cheating in perfect (i.e., properties 1: and 2: hold) threshold schemes. The same technique can be used for non-perfect schemes, such as, for example, rump schemes.
